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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






RICHARD C. ANGINO; ALICE K. ANGINO;  
ANGINO LAW FIRM, P.C.; KING DRIVE CORP., 
         Appellants   
        
v. 
 
BRANCH BANKING AND TRUST COMPANY 
________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-19-cv-01618) 
District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner 
________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
On November 20, 2020 
 
Before: AMBRO, BIBAS and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 







ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 
 




 Appellants Richard Angino, Alice Angino, Angino Law Firm, P.C., and King 
Drive Corp. appeal the District Court’s Order of March 4, 2020, dismissing their four-
count Complaint against Branch Banking and Trust Company (BB&T)1 for failure to 
state a claim.  Appellants also claim the District Court erred by not striking BB&T’s 
motion to dismiss and by striking Appellants’ jury trial demand.  For the reasons below, 
we will affirm. 
I.2 
 In February 2007, the Anginos borrowed $2.2 million from Graystone Bank, a 
predecessor-in-interest to BB&T.  The loan was evidenced by a promissory note and 
secured by a mortgage on 4503 North Front Street, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.  Also in 
2007, the Angino Law Firm’s predecessor obtained a $1 million line of credit from 
Graystone Bank, evidenced by a promissory note.  The Anginos guaranteed this line of 
credit.  In February 2009, King Drive executed a Guaranty for the Anginos’ and the law 
firm’s loans.  The Guaranty contains a confession of judgment provision that authorized 
BB&T to confess judgment against King Drive if it defaulted.  The Anginos are King 
Drive’s only officers and shareholders.  In February 2013, the $1 million line of credit 
was replaced with a $600,000 line of credit and $400,000 term loan. 
 In 2016, BB&T filed suit for breach of contract against the Anginos, King Drive, 
and other corporate entities, seeking to collect on the $600,000 line of credit and 
 
1 BB&T is now known as Truist Bank. 
2 Because we write primarily for the parties, we discuss the facts and proceedings only to the 
extent necessary for resolution of this case. 
3 
 
$400,000 term loan.3  The Anginos challenged BB&T’s claimed attorney’s fees and costs 
but not the overdue principal and interest.4  After a bench trial, the court held for BB&T 
and awarded it attorney’s fees and costs.5 
 Meanwhile, in September 2018, Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, had sold the 4503 
North Front Street property to a subsidiary of BB&T at a tax upset sale because of unpaid 
real estate taxes.  In June 2019, BB&T filed a complaint for confession of judgment 
against King Drive in Pennsylvania state court, seeking to collect the unpaid balance on 
the $2.2 million note that King Drive had guaranteed and that had come due in February 
2017.  The state court entered judgment for BB&T for $1.704 million, which was the 
amount BB&T had requested. 
 The Appellants brought the present action against BB&T in September 2019. 
II.  
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The District Court dismissed two 
counts in the Complaint without prejudice.  Ordinarily, a dismissal without prejudice is 
not an appealable final order.6  However, an exception exists if the plaintiffs intend to 
“stand” on their complaint.7  Here, Appellants asserted that they intended to stand on 
 
3 See Compl., Branch Banking & Tr. Co. v. Angino Law Firm, P.C., Nos. 1:16-CV-712, 1:16-
CV-713 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 2016), Dkt. No. 1. 
4 See Branch Banking & Tr. Co. v. Angino Law Firm, P.C., No. 1:16-CV-712, 2018 WL 
4404627, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 17, 2018), aff’d, 809 F. App’x 102 (3d Cir. 2020). 
5 Id. at *10. 
6 See Brennan v. Kulick, 407 F.3d 603, 606 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). 




their Complaint and that their Complaint, as pleaded, satisfied Rule 12(b)(6).  Thus, we 
have jurisdiction to consider dismissal of all four claims.   
III.  
Our review of the District Court’s Order dismissing the Complaint for failure to 
state a claim is plenary.8  “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.’”9  A plaintiff pleads a claim when the pleaded factual content “allows the court to 
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”10  
Here, the Complaint asserts four counts:  (1) fraud, (2) abuse of process, (3) malicious 
use of process, and (4) a Dragonetti Act violation.  We agree with the District Court that 
the counts failed to state a claim; we take each in turn. 
 The fraud count alleges that BB&T made several misrepresentations in documents 
filed in connection with its complaint for confession of judgment, including that BB&T 
was entitled to confess judgment at all.  But the count fails to plead that Appellants relied 
on BB&T’s statements, an element of fraud under Pennsylvania law.11  The Complaint 
alleges that “[t]he fraud was relied upon in the entering of judgment and injured Plaintiffs 
as they now have a large judgment blocking any hope of obtaining any sort of funding.”12  
This does not allege that anyone relied on the statements.  The only plausible inference 
 
8 See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008). 
9 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 
570 (2007)). 
10 Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). 
11 See Gibbs v. Ernst, 538 Pa. 193, 207 (1994) (citation omitted). 
12 JA 13. 
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from this allegation is that the state court, not Appellants, somehow relied on the 
statements in entering the judgment.  Because this count fails to plead a necessary 
element, it fails to state a claim. 
 The abuse of process count alleges that BB&T filed a “frivolous” complaint for 
confession of judgment “for the purpose of extorting money” from King Drive and 
“harassing” Appellants.13  The elements of an abuse of process claim are that the 
defendant “(1) used a legal process against the plaintiff, (2) primarily to accomplish a 
purpose for which the process was not designed; and (3) harm has been caused to the 
plaintiff.”14  The Complaint does not plead any facts suggesting that BB&T filed the suit 
for an improper purpose.  The conclusory allegations that BB&T filed the suit to harass 
and extort Appellants are not enough to state a claim. Thus, this count also fails. 
 We consider counts three and four together because Pennsylvania has codified the 
tort of malicious use of process in the Dragonetti Act.15  Count three alleges that BB&T 
“maliciously filed the Confession of Judgment action against Plaintiffs stating meritless 
claims.”16  Count four alleges that BB&T “filed frivolous claims in the form of a 
confession of judgment for improper purposes in a malicious manner.”17  An element of 
the tort of malicious prosecution is that the proceedings have been terminated “in favor of 
the person against whom they are brought.”18  However, Appellants do not allege that the 
 
13 JA 15.  
14 P.J.A. v. H.C.N., 156 A.3d 284, 288 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017) (citations omitted). 
15 See 42 Pa. C.S §§ 8351–55. 
16 JA 15–17. 
17 Id. 
18 42 Pa. C.S. § 8351(a)(2). 
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confession-of-judgment proceeding has terminated in their favor.  Therefore, these counts 
fail to state a claim. 
IV. 
 Appellants also claim that the District Court erred in denying their motion to strike 
which asserted that BB&T’s motion to dismiss was late.19  BB&T had filed a short 
motion to dismiss within the deadline and explained that it would file an accompanying 
memorandum of law within 14 days, as permitted by the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania’s local rules.20  Appellants moved to strike BB&T’s motion because the 
memorandum of law was not submitted by the deadline. The District Court denied the 
Appellants’ motion.   
We will affirm.  The District Court explained that “[BB&T’s] Rule 12 motion and 
to-be-filed brief are akin to a motion to extend time, which this court may grant in its 
discretion” under Rule 6(b)(1).21  It also noted that “Rule 12 motions rarely, if ever, 
implicate finality of judgments or time limits for appeal.”22  For these reasons, the court 
was “not concerned with [BB&T] filing a supporting brief after filing its Rule 12 motion 
 
19 Relatedly, Appellants claim that BB&T’s motion to dismiss lacked particularly in violation of 
Rule 7 because it was not accompanied by a timely filed memorandum of law.  We review a 
decision on whether to strike a pleading for abuse of discretion.  See, e.g., Hatchett v. United 
States, 330 F.3d 875, 887 (6th Cir. 2003). 
20 See M.D. Pa. Local Rule 7.5 (2014). 




(so long as that brief is filed within the time allotted by the local rules).”23  The District 
Court did not abuse its discretion in so ordering. 
V. 
 Finally, Appellants cursorily challenge the District Court’s decision to strike their 
jury trial demand.24  The $2.2 million note and King Drive’s 2009 Guaranty “waive the 
right to any jury trial in any action, proceeding, or counterclaim.”25  Parties can waive the 
right to a jury trial if the waiver is knowing and voluntary.26  Appellants, who include 
attorneys, do not offer any evidence that the waiver was not knowing or voluntary.  Thus, 
we will affirm the District Court on this point. 
VI. 
 We will affirm the District Court’s Order of March 4, 2020. 
 
23 Id. 
24 Our review of this question is plenary.  See Tracinda Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 502 F.3d 
212, 222 n.9 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). 
25 JA 24, 52. 
26 Tracinda, 502 F.3d at 222 (citation omitted). 
